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The mechanisms by which Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) support public 
sector reforms have been widely studied in e-
government literature. This paper contributes to this 
literature analyzing how the entanglement of law and 
technological systems shapes the trajectory of policy-
making. The paper discusses the case of the policy-
making which led to the approval of changes in key 
articles of the Italian Digital Administration Code 
(DAC). The paper contributes to the e-government 
literature highlighting that the policy-making choices 
and options are constrained by how previous law and 
technology have been entangled to support the 
digitalization of the public administration. The paper 
provides valuable insights to better understand the 
impacts associated with the digitalization of the public 
administration, specifically of legal norms and 
procedures, on policy-making processes.  
1. Introduction  
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) 
play a key role in the modernization of the public 
administration. Public sector reforms rely on ICTs to 
promote efficiency and effectiveness of public policies 
[1-4]. 
Technology impacts on public administration have 
been studied in their effects on the quality and quantity 
of the provision of public services [5, 6], but also in the 
effects on the different values carried by the policies 
which informed the design and deployment of ICT in 
the public sector [7, 8]. Research has also focused on 
how law and technology entangle and on the mechanism 
by which these entanglements shape the public policies 
informed by that law [9, 10]. 
Policy-making processes, stemming from the 
definition of a policy goal, result in the drafting of new 
legal norms, codes, or frameworks which regulate what 
a policy is, how it applies and to whom it applies, when 
approved by the parliamentary process [11]. 
Policy-making is therefore closely linked to the 
law-making process [12]. Pre-existing techno-legal 
entanglements affect the law-making process and hence 
the policy-making process. The paper sheds light on 
these complex processes and offers new insights to 
better understand the nature and magnitude of the 
impacts of technology on the public sector and more 
specifically on policy-making processes. 
The paper is structured as follow: section two 
illustrates the relevant literature investigating the 
negotiations of law and technology. Section three 
accounts for the impacts of techno-legal entanglements 
on policy-making process. Section four introduces the 
theoretical framework of functional simplification and 
closure. Section five explains the methodology followed 
in this paper. Section six presents the case of the Italian 
DAC reform. Section seven provides an explanation of 
techno-legal entanglements emerging from the case 
study. Section eight discusses the main findings from 
the case study. Section nine illustrates the conclusions 
of the paper. 
2. Background  
The complex nature of the negotiations between law 
and technology and their impacts on society have been 
researched by scholars in different domains. Scholars in 
law have mostly studied the impacts of technology 
adoptions on the way in which judicial decisions are 
taken and their impacts on society [13-15]. A good 
example of this tradition is the work by Reed and 
Murray [13] which concentrates on how authority, 
control and legitimacy apply to the cyberspace, going 
beyond the traditional law domain. Scholars in 
philosophy have mostly analysed the ethical 
implications associated with the legalization of the most 
advanced technologies [16-18]. Mittelstadt and Floridi 
[18] offer interesting findings on the regulations of Big 
Data in biomedical and health sectors. In the field of 
Information Systems, the entanglements between law 
and technology have been studied mainly looking at 
how the code of the technology negotiates with the code 
of the law [9, 19]. In particular, the research by Lanzara 





   
 
   
 
[19] sheds light on the way by which technological 
systems have profoundly impacted procedures and tasks 
in the field of e-justice. Despite an increasing aim to 
bridge the domains of law and technology, the call for 
“an interdisciplinary tradition of law and technology” 
[20] has mostly gone unheard. Significant exceptions to 
this trend are Brownsword [21], Hildebrandt [22, 23], 
Mohr and Contini [24], who explore the way by which 
technology and law in their entanglements define new 
techno-legal institutional and organizational 
environments whose specific characteristics are not 
fully explained yet.  
The emergence of these techno-legal entanglements 
raises several questions about the nature of the formal 
and informal mechanisms that shape institutional and 
organizational relations and contexts. To analyse these 
mechanisms, scholars have investigated how the 
regulative properties of law and technology negotiate 
when they are deployed to regulate the same 
mechanisms which govern organizational or 
institutional relations and contexts. 
The regulative properties of law are widely 
recognized and acknowledged, and to some extent even 
intuitive: law is designed and deployed to alter the 
behaviours of others with the intention of producing an 
outcome [23]. In other words, law has a normative 
purpose, which is to define what is legal and what is not 
[24]. Law boundaries are distinctly demarcated: it is 
always clear who are the regulators and who are the 
subjects of regulation, what is regulated, when and how 
is it possible to challenge what is regulated by the law. 
Also, even when the law produces ambiguities – since 
law presupposes interpretation – the patterns to adjust 
and modify the regulative properties of the law are clear 
and formalized in the law [24]. 
The boundaries of the regulative properties of 
technology are not equally demarcated. Technology is 
inherently multistable [23]: its structures are often 
loosely connected [25], and the reproduction of 
technological outcomes follows patterns of generativity 
[26] which makes almost impossible to anticipate and 
predict its regulative impacts. Platforms and Artificial 
Intelligence, for example, generate externalities [27] 
and create opacity [28] which are not under the direct 
control of the designers or the users [28-30]. Therefore, 
these technologies result in regulative regimes that are 
neither accountable nor intelligible from the perspective 
of policymakers. 
Technology works according to the codes and scripts 
it contains, which are different from the norms enclosed 
in any legal act. Scholars have accounted for the ways 
by which technology and law negotiate their regulative 
properties in formal configurations [19] which result in 
techno-legal entanglements. Techno-legal 
entanglements have very specific regulative 
characteristics which impact organization and 
institutional actions. Techno-legal entanglements 
govern the organizational contexts due to a combination 
of existing logics already in place (norms, legal 
prescriptions, regulations) and technological properties. 
These entanglements are regulative in the sense that, 
once adopted, they re-structure the activities of the 
workflows and set or span the boundaries of the 
activities. However, the combination of technological 
and legal domains is not an easy task to achieve. Often, 
techno-legal entanglements have composite nature and 
produce unpredictable outcomes following unstable 
trajectories [19]. For this reason, a nuanced account of 
the impact of techno-legal entanglements in policy-
making processes is necessary.  
3. Law, technology, and policy-making 
Policy-making consists of a process which includes 
three main phases: (a) deciding the policy, (b) producing 
the legislative clauses (law-making), (c) handling 
Parliamentary process [11]. Many different actors 
concur to shape policy-making: members of the 
government, Members of Parliament (MPs), civil 
servants, experts involved in the activities [11]. All 
these actors can be defined policymakers. When 
technologies intertwine with the law-making process 
new challenges emerge for the policymakers. The 
policy-making is transformed from a law-making 
process into the design of a techno-legal entanglement 
where law and technology negotiate their regulative 
regimes. Since the nature of these regulative regimes is 
a complex balance, the unfolding of techno-legal 
entanglements shall be careful monitored (a) to avoid 
outcomes which contrast with the drivers of the policy-
making process, and (b) to oversee that the regulative 
outcomes remain within the boundaries of democratic 
and constitutional principles. 
Research has shown that the impact of technology 
might put at risk the outcome of legislation if 
policymakers are not aware of the very specific 
characteristics of technology [24, 31]. For example, 
Bovens and Zouridis [32] have illustrated that 
technology used to deploy public policies carries 
regulative powers that impact and potentially change 
what is regulated by constitutional norms and 
democratic principles. In their view, technology 
contributes to the definition of a regulative regime 
which cannot be easily reconducted within the 
boundaries of constitutionality [32]. Any adoption of 
technological instruments that regulate the functioning 
of the public sector carries risks of undermining the 
legitimacy of our society [32].  
Building on this research tradition, this paper aims 
to make a step forward by shedding light on the way by 
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which technology transforms not only the 
implementation of policies which are the outcome of the 
policy-making process, but the policy-making process 
itself. In this paper we explore how technology creates 
the conditions to fundamentally alter the procedures and 
patterns which regulate the design, drafting, discussion 
and approval of an act with the force of law and hence 
the policy shaped by that law. The paper offers 
theoretical contribution to the study of law and 
technology by showing that technology modifies the 
policy-making process having an impact on the 
underpinning law-making process. By so doing, 
technology acts with the authority of a constitutional 
force which is not foreseen in any legal environment. 
Hence, the constitutionality of these techno-legal 
entanglements needs to be carefully investigated by 
scholars and adequately acknowledged by policymakers 
and practitioners.  
4. Theoretical Framework 
To understand how technology impacts on the 
policy-making process we rely on the theory of 
functional simplification and closure. This theory 
explains how technological artefacts carry regulative 
properties [33, 34] which transform the policy-making 
process. This literature builds on Luhmann’s seminal 
work, whose research has illustrated the specific 
technological properties that impact and modify 
interactions in the environments where technology is 
adopted [35]. Organizations deploy technological 
systems to improve the execution of specific workflows. 
Technological systems to operate must receive inputs 
and produce outputs. Inputs to be processed by the 
technology need to be formatted in a way (language) 
which is comprehensible by the technology to generate 
its outputs. To be able to process information from the 
external context, technological systems have to 
reconstruct in the code of technology the practices and 
actions proper of organizations [33] in a language which 
is understandable by the technology. To do so, 
technology frames activities and practices from the 
external world in a language that is readable by 
software. When technology processes these inputs to 
produce outputs it also does so in the way standardized 
in the code of the used software or technology. The 
outputs are the result of stable and standardized 
interactions designed in the code of the software / 
technology [33]. Luhmann described these 
transformations as generated by specific properties of 
technology: functional simplification and closure [35]. 
Functional simplification is the process by which 
technology reduces (or simplifies) the causal 
connections of the external world in a way which is 
understandable by the code of technology [35]. In other 
words, all the practices and activities of a specific 
environment are encapsulated in logical sequences 
which constitute the core of any technological artifact.  
The reconstruction of activities and practices in the 
code of technology would not be possible without a 
parallel process of functional closure. Functional 
closure is the isolation of the set of causal connections 
from the context, to prevent the context (namely, 
processes and actors) to intervene on the technological 
execution, and to allow technology to replicate practices 
and activities. The properties of functional 
simplification and closure allow technology to frame 
normative, behavioural, and legal logics which shape 
organizational contexts, and to reproduce them 
according to technological standards.  
This theory sheds light on what happens when 
technological systems functionally simplify and close 
practices and activities: they change their nature, 
because the processes of functional simplification and 
closure modify forever their original characteristics. 
Consequently, the new causal connections, rewritten in 
technological frames and stabilized, have the authority 
to impact and modify organizational tasks and 
workflows. Since technological systems are 
increasingly adopted in organizations to improve the 
execution of tasks and activities, technology has the 
ability to profoundly alter the underpinnings of complex 
organizations. This can be true for cultural and social 
norms, but it is also true for more formalized elements, 
such as institutions and legal norms.   
5. Methodology 
To discuss how the regulative power of technology 
impacts the policy-making process, we rely on a case 
from the Italian parliament ruling on the Codice 
dell’Amministrazione Digitale (DAC – Digital 
Administration Code). The paper follows the case study 
research approach [36] since it aims to investigate a 
phenomenon within its context [37]. In addition, the 
case study approach offers relevant insights when the 
boundaries between a phenomenon and a context are not 
clear [36]. Since we account for the ways by which 
technology impacts upon the policy-making process, we 
need a nuanced evaluation of the actions taking place 
along the different phases which structure the law-
making process.  
Building on Yin’s taxonomy, we adopt the 
explanatory case study approach [36] because it is 
suitable to explain how a single factor (technology 
adoption) impacts a specific practice (the policy-making 
process). The explanatory case study approach is 
relevant when the outcome of a process is 
straightforward and we can concentrate on the analysis 
of the reasons that explain the outcome [37]. The case 
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of the Italian parliament passing the law that reforms the 
DAC is exemplificative to account for the way by which 
technology impacts the policy-making process. Data 
collection consists of qualitative data which includes 
three types of sources: (a) official transcripts from the 
Italian Parliament Committees sessions which discussed 
the drafting of the regulations; (b) primary sources of 
law and government documents; (c) secondary sources 
such as analysis, commentaries, and opinions from 
professionals of the judicial sector. Table 1 illustrates 
the documents consulted. 
 
 
Table 1. List of documents consulted 
 
6. Case study  
Over the years, the Italian government has 
repeatedly attempted to reform the Public 
Administration by leveraging on ICTs. The launch of 
the DAC in 2005 provide to most relevant attempt to 
define a single legal framework for the digitalization of 
the public sector.  
6.1 Digital Administration Code (DAC) 
Since the deployment of DAC in 2005 that Italian 
policymakers had to intervene several times to update 
the legal architecture of DAC. Italy is a civil law-based 
system. Since technological specifications are part of 
the DAC bill, the policymakers needed to adopt every 
single modification of DAC with a formal bill or 
regulation. Both the Parliament and the Government 
concur to discuss and design the changes in the 
legislation on DAC.  
The aim of the DAC is to regulate all the aspects of 
the digital transformation of the public sector. The DAC 
equally frames the digitalization norms across different 
branches of the public bureaucracies and on the 
relationship among public administration, business, and 
citizens.  
The DAC bill is not the only regulative framework 
which frames the digital transformation of the Italian 
public sector. Many public sector organizations, such as 
Ministries, agencies, public bodies, had built their own 
ICT systems and drafted normative codes to digitize 
tasks and processes. Accordingly, when the DAC was 
introduced, the Italian policymakers had to align the 
DAC dispositions about ICT with those already in place 
across the Italian public sector organizations. A 
misalignment among different sources of law such as 
between DAC and ministerial normative codes could in 
fact originate legal ambiguities and generate 
organizational drawbacks. Furthermore, misalignment 
in regulations designed to enable IT systems could 
produce further disadvantages. Many public 
organizations had their own IT systems, carefully 
designed, and crafted to execute specific tasks which 
could not be executed had the system not be supported 
and enable by the DAC regulative legal framework.  
When systems were not supported by DAC public 
managers raised concerned and doubts about the 
possibility to adapt or transform their IT systems to 
comply with the DAC regulative framework.  
The policymakers responsible to maintain the DAC 
regulations updated discovered that there were 
resistances to the general application of DAC across all 
the Italian public administration. The most challenging 
case has been the conflict between the DAC regulative 
framework and the norms which regulate the Processo 
Civile Telematico (Civil Trial Online - CTO).  
Subject  Name of document  Type of document Date(s)  
DAC Legislative decrees 82/2005, 235/2010, 179/2016, 217/2017 Primary legislation 
 
Civil Trial  Decrees-Law: 24/2010, 221/2012, 114/2014, 132/2015 Primary legislation  
 
Online Ministry of Justice Decree 21 February 2011, n. 44. Secondary legislation  21/2/2011  
Ministry of Justice Act 16 April 2014 Technical specifications 16/4/2014 
DAC Chamber of Deputies Committee on Constitutional Affairs minutes Official transcript 23/6, 2-3/8 2016   
Legislative Chamber of Deputies Committee on Budget minutes Official transcript 21/7, 26/7 2016 
Process Joint Committee on Simplification minutes Official transcript 20/7, 27/7 2016  
Senate Committee on Constitutional Affairs minutes Official transcript 29/6, 12/7, 27/7 2016   
Senate Committee on Budget minutes Official transcript 1-3/8 2016  
Senate Committee on Finance and Treasury minutes  Official transcript 19/7, 27/7 2016  
Council of State advisory opinion  Formal opinion  17/3/2016  
State-Regions Conference advisory opinion  Formal opinion 3/6/2016  
Regions and Provinces Conference advisory opinion  Formal opinion 3/6/2016  
Union of the Provinces advisory opinion Formal opinion 3/6/2016  
Data Privacy Authority advisory opinion  Formal opinion 9/62016  
Chamber of Deputies Report attached to Government Act 307  Report  
 
    
Others  Council of Magistrates Resolution on DAC  Formal Act  9/1/2019 
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6.2 Civil Trial Online (CTO) 
The Civil Trial Online (CTO) modernizes the civil 
branch of justice through the adoption of ICT. The CTO 
is the outcome of multiple legislative acts. This corpus 
of laws encompasses primary and secondary sources of 
law (including ministerial regulations and technical 
specifications) and stratified customs.  
Specifically, the two main primary acts which 
organize, and structure CTO are laws 24/2010 and 
221/2012. The secondary acts are less relevant in terms 
of juridical hierarchy, yet still important: the ministerial 
decree 44/2011 sets the guidelines, while the technical 
specifications attached to the decree (Act 16 April 2014) 
define the required characteristic for technological 
instruments.  
6.3 The reform 
In 2016 and 2017 Italian Parliament approved two 
legislative decrees – bills – to modernize the DAC 
(legislative decrees 179/2016 and 217/2017). The 
legislative decree is a very specific type of bill, inspired 
by the government under a Parliamentary mandate. The 
mandate clearly determines the boundaries of what the 
government can cover in the legislative decree. The 
Government receives a formal mandate by the 
Parliament to produce a draft legislative decree. The 
decree is then submitted to the Parliament for approvals. 
The Parliament examines and assesses the decree within 
60 days. Usually, the decree is first discussed by the 
relevant parliamentary Committees which provide 
feedback to the Government before the decree is voted 
by the Parliament.  The Government might consider the 
committees’ recommendations, but it has no obligation 
to do so before submitting the decree to the Parliament 
vote.  
In relation to the legislative process concerning 
decrees 179/2016, Parliament’s Committees held 
multiple discussions to produce an informed opinion to 
be submitted to the Government.  
In 2016, when Committees began the examination of 
government’s draft legislative decrees 179/2016 
(Government Act 307), MPs became aware of one 
potential problem. Two specific articles of the act 
drafted by the Government – art. 2.6 and 18.1 – aimed 
to change how the DAC regulations applies to civil and 
criminal law trials. 
The preexisting version of DAC (Article 20, 
“Validity and effectiveness of the electronic document 
as evidence”) provided technical specification for 
electronic document to be automatically considered 
valid evidence in trials; leaving to the judge the 
discretionarily to admit electronic documents which do 
not fulfill the DAC technical specification as pieces of 
evidence. 
The article 2.6, and 18.1 of the Government Act 307 
transform the effectiveness of the existing DAC Article 
20. Article 2.6 stated that:  
“The provisions of this Code shall also apply to civil 
and criminal trials, insofar as they are compatible and 
unless otherwise provided by the provisions on civil trial 
online.” 
While article 18.1, stated:  
“The provisions concerning the electronic filing of 
acts and documents in accordance with the legislation, 
including regulations, of Civil Trial Online shall remain 
in force”.  
While article 2.6 is a general disposition, article 18.1 
is very specific and aims to maintain a special provision 
for the e-filing of electronic documents. The Ministry of 
Justice’s Decree 44/2011 and technical disposition 
produced by the Ministry of Justice in April 2014 
defines the e-filing procedure of electronic documents 
in CTO. The Decree and the technical dispositions 
define what an “electronic document” is in relation to 
the CTO: what characteristics it must have, and how to 
handle the electronic document in each phase, from 
production to transmission, from filing to storage.  
The outcome of the joint formulation of articles 2.6 
and 18.1 is that the CTO procedures were excluded from 
the domain of application of DAC. Since this was a 
formulation explicitly mentioned in the decree drafted 
by the Government, it witnessed a clear aim to create 
two distinct regimes – one set by the rules of CTO, and 
the other one organized according to DAC dispositions. 
In other words, the CTO acquired a status of 
exceptionality in comparison to the other digitalized 
procedures, ruled by DAC.  
6.4 Parliament’s Committees assessment of 
Government Act 307  
Following the procedure for the approval of the 
Legislative Decree 179/2016, the Parliament was 
required to provide an advisory opinion about the Act 
307 drafted by the government. Several Committees 
were involved in this process: Committee for 
Constitutional Affairs and Budget of the Chamber of 
Deputies; Committee for Constitutional Affairs, Budget 
and Finance and Treasury of the Senate; and the Joint 
Committee for Simplification.  
The analysis of the Committees sessions transcripts 
shows that the Committee for Constitutional Affairs of 
the Chamber of Deputies held the liveliest debate 
articles 2.6 and 18.1. Regarding article 2.6, the 
Committee proposed to expand the application of DAC 
to all type of trial Act 307 only referred to civil and 
criminal trials. The Committee wanted to guarantee the 
Page 2382
   
 
   
 
application of DAC “(…) to every trial before a judicial 
authority, unless otherwise provided by the provisions 
of Civil Trial Online”.  
The Committee also asked the government to cancel 
art. 18.1 (“The provisions concerning the electronic 
filing of acts and documents in accordance with the 
legislation, including regulations, of Civil Trial Online 
shall remain in force”). The Committee believed that 
this disposition exceeded the powers of the government. 
In fact, the provision could potentially create a special 
regime for the CTO, outside of the DAC domain. In the 
view of the Committee this fell outside the boundaries 
of the mandate the Parliament gave to the Government.  
The Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies 
focused mostly on the economic sustainability of the 
reform and did not raise any issue about its content.  
The Senate’s Committees, building on an advisory 
opinion from the Italian Council of State1 released on 
April 2016, criticized the formulation of article 2.6 
advocating for an extension of the DAC applicability. 
Accordingly, Senate’s Committee for Constitutional 
Affairs asked the government to explicitly include 
administrative, tax and accountancy trials references in 
article 2.6. The Committee didn’t present any specific 
comment on article 18.1. The Senate’s Budget 
Committee didn’t express any concern on the issue.  
Finally, the work carried out by the Joint 
Simplification Committee was relatively limited, with 
an opinion that produced one observation on article 2.6. 
The Committee insisted on the need to extend the 
applicability of DAC to civil and criminal trials “in 
order to increase the homogeneity to the regulative 
framework”. The Joint Simplification Committee relied 
on the Council of State’s opinion and echoed the 
Senate’s Committee for Constitutional Affairs.  
A summary of the assessment of the draft legislative 
decree (Government Act 307) in the competent 
committees can be found in Tables 2 and 3. 
Table 2. Assessment of the Government Act 307 in the Chamber of Deputies’ Committees 
Committee Sessions Observations on art. 2.6  Observations on art. 18.1 
Constitutional    
Affairs 23 6 2016 None  None  
 02 8 2016 The Committee proposes to amend article 2.6 to 
ensure the application of the provisions of the DAC 
“to any trials before a judicial authority, unless 
otherwise provided by the provisions on telematic 
process” (remark c). 
The committee asked the Government to delete from 
Article 18.1, paragraph c, the words “The provisions 
concerning the electronic filing of acts and documents 
in accordance with the legislation, including 
regulations, of CTO shall remain in force” (remark m).   
 03 8 2016 None None 
Budget  21 7 2016 None None 
 26 7 2016 None None 
Joint      
Simplification 20 07 2016 The rapporteur sheds a light on the need to extend the 
applicability of the DAC to civil and criminal trials. 
He then formulates a proposal for an observation that 
makes explicit “in Article 2.6 of the draft, that it also 
refers to administrative, accounting and tax trials, to 
make the regulative framework more homogeneous”. 
None 
 27 07 2016 Opinion is approved in line with rapporteur’s 
remarks.   
None 
Table 3. Assessment of the Government Act 307 in the Senate’s Committees 
 
1 The highest authority of administrative justice 
Committee Sessions Observations on art. 2.6  Observations on art. 18.1 
Constitutional    
Affairs 29 06 2016 The rapporteur addresses article 2.6 without going 
into the relationship between CTO and DAC. 
The rapporteur addresses article 18.1 without going into 
the relationship between CTO and DAC. 
 12 07 2016 None None 
 27 07 2016 The rapporteur suggests incorporating the following 
recommendation: “Secondly, in Article 2.6, which 
accounts for the application of the DAC to civil and 
criminal trials, insofar as they are compatible and 
unless otherwise provided for in the rules on Civil 
The rapporteur addresses Article 18 but does not insist 
on the CTO's exemption from the DAC. The same from 
the MEPs who speak about Article 18.  
The general focus is on the characteristics of advanced, 
qualified, or digital electronic signatures. 
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The discussion within the Parliamentary 
Committees shows that MPs expressed concerns about 
the formulation of the two key articles of the 
Government Act.  
The Government decided to partially accept only 
the new proposed formulation of article 2.6 made by 
Senate’s Committee for Constitutional Affairs. In the 
final version proposed by the Government article 2.6 
reads: “The provisions of this Code apply to civil, 
criminal, administrative, accounting and tax trials, 
insofar as they are compatible and unless otherwise 
provided by the provisions on Civil Trial Online”. The 
government wanted to maintain the special regime for 
CTO, but also agreed to extend the application of DAC 
to other types of trials. The Parliament approved the 
final version proposed by the Government on 26 
August 2016. The analysis of different sources – 
Committees’ sessions minutes, comments and 
opinions by experts and professionals – reveals that 
the decision of the government to reject the comments 
and recommendation of the committees and to push 
for the approval of the version which grants the CTO 
a special regime outside the DAC is determined by the 
techno-legal entanglement which shapes the CTO and 
make it de facto incompatible with DAC. 
7. CTO: a techno-legal entanglement   
The CTO to be effective needs the development of 
different technological solutions. Fundamental 
requirements are the deployment of a Case 
Management System (CMS) and of an e-filing system. 
The CMS provides the backbone of the court digital 
functionalities while e-filing consists of the front 
office technology which structures and support the 
exchange of procedural documents online. The 
development of a CMS and of an e-filing system 
requires both technological and legal compliance. To 
be effective the two systems need to be able to fully 
integrate. They shall be designed to provide full 
technological, semantic and legal interoperability [9]. 
E-filing systems need to be able to smoothly exchange 
documents with the Case Management System, in a 
way which guarantees that the exchanged documents 
are in the format prescribed by the law and containing 
the information also prescribed by the law.  
The design of the e-filing system is the result of a 
negotiation process between what is required by the 
technology to support interoperability and what is 
prescribed by the law to guarantee legal compliance 
with the procedural codes (document formats, email 
protocols and standards, digital signature encryption, 
data transmission protocols and standards). The 
negotiation was long and complicated, and it required 
many changes in the law and in the technology [38]. 
Eventually, designers managed to achieve a successful 
alignment of technological specification with the legal 
code, but it was also necessary to foster changes in the 
legal code to align with technological requirements. 
After almost 15 years of techno-legal negotiations, this 
system resulted in a sustainable and successful techno-
legal entanglement able to fully support the needs of 
the CTO and lead to its successful deployment and use 
[38]. Article 18.1 if amended as requested by the 
parliament would have put at risk the effectiveness of 
the e-filing techno-legal entanglement and hence of 
the CTO. 
8. Discussion  
The Government turned down the request to revise 
the formulation of article 18.1 and decided that the 
electronic filing of acts and documents, at the core of 
the CTO, should be granted a special regime instead 
of aligning to DAC provisions. CTO regulations on the 
electronic document represents a cornerstone of the 
way by which trials take place in Italy. All the actors 
involved in the civil trials - lawyers, judges, clerks - 
must follow CTO regulations on electronic document 
filing (the format of the document, the transmission, 
the collection, the signature), otherwise they risk 
invalidating the trial or to lose the legal dispute. The e-
filing norms and technologies were in place since 
2011, the technology which functionally simplified 
and closed the e-filing process defined the regulative 
regime governing the e-filing procedures. Daily 
Trial Online, it would be appropriate to include an 
explicit reference also to administrative, accounting 
and tax proceedings, in order to make the regulative 
framework more homogeneous”, as suggested by the 
Council of State.   
A government representative who is attending the 
Committee’s session, reiterated that the government 
does not want to amend Article 18. 
Budget 01 08 2016 None None 
 02 08 2016 None None 
 03 08 2016 None  None 
Finance and     
Treasury 19 07 2016 None None 
 27 07 2016 None   None 
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activities such as notifying an act, uploading materials 
in pdf format, digitally signing a document, have 
become formalized in the e-filing technologies. The 
entanglements of formal norms and technology shaped 
the way by which tasks and procedures are executed in 
civil courts. Against this background, the amended 
version of article 18.1 of the DAC regulation would 
have introduced a new regulative regime for the CTO, 
which is not compatible with the existing techno-legal 
entanglements which govern e-filing and hence the 
CTO. The government had to protect the CTO’s 
techno-legal entanglement to preserve the 
effectiveness of the CTO proceedings. By rejecting the 
application of changes that would have extended the 
DAC to CTO, the government aimed to safeguard the 
techno-legal systems that renders valid and effective 
the transactions that must be carried in a CTO 
proceeding [39]. As explained by Petrucci [40], the 
choice to exclude CTO from DAC stemmed from the 
willingness to limit the difficult reconciliation 
between general-specialist regulations (the DAC), 
super-specialist regulations (the CTO Regulations), 
which conflict on how to regulate the same legal 
proceeding and, in particular, the electronic document 
and its transmission and storage. Experts also noted 
that the Italian government acted to avoid the 
repetition of a mistake made in 2015, when a collision 
between DAC norms and CTO put at risk the 
effectiveness of CTO proceedings [41]. This can 
explain why with article 18.1 the government acted 
with caution and respect, to avoid the controversy over 
the legal and technological specifications of the digital 
document that emerged at the beginning of 2015, when 
the DAC put the CTO on its knees, changing the 
format and procedures with regards to the forms of to 
be used in e-filing [41]. 
The decision of the government to reject the 
proposal of changing or withdrawing article 18.1 was 
dictated by the nature of the existing techno-legal 
entanglement which shapes the regulative regime of e-
filing and hence of CTO. The government’s choices in 
the drafting of the policy designed in the amended 
regulation of DAC to give special regime to the CTO, 
also overruling the parliamentary concerns with 
regards to legitimacy of such an act, was dictated by 
the e-filing techno-legal entanglement. The techno-
legal entanglement, de-facto, constrained the policy-
making process determining what could be designed 
in the revised version of DAC and what could not be 
changed by DAC. The existing techno-legal 
entanglement, de facto, became the key actor which 
shaped the DAC policy overtaking government and 
parliamentary authority and legitimacy. 
9. Conclusions  
The impact of technology on the application of law 
and policies has been discussed by scholars in many 
different domains. E-government scholars have also 
discussed how technology carries political power [32, 
42]. In this paper we complement this research 
discussing how technology shapes legal norms and 
regulation into techno-legal entanglement and how 
this techno-legal entanglement constraint the policy-
making process. We draw our conclusions building on 
the analysis of the legislative process which led to the 
design and approval of changes in the Italian core 
legislation which governs the digital administration. 
The case reveals that the techno-legal entanglement 
which shaped the CTO limited the policy-making 
options and hence the definition of a unique and 
integrated document exchange format across the 
Italian public administration. 
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